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BOOK REVIEWS

The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. viii and 215. $32.50.
THOMAS P. FLINT, University of Notre Dame
In many respects, this essay is an exemplary piece of philosophical theology.
The topic it addresses - the alleged incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human freedom - is one of the most important, and most
perplexing, in the history of philosophy. Zagzebski, who writes as well as
anyone working in the field today, does an excellent job of describing the
problem with exceptional clarity. Her critique of others' solutions, and her
presentation of her own, are equally sharp and thoughtful. Whether or not
one ends up agreeing with her, one can hardly help but benefit from her
stimulating discussion.
Though Zagzebski shows great care in formulating various versions of
arguments purporting to show an incompatibility between freedom and foreknowledge, a simplified presentation of one of these variations will suffice
to illustrate the alleged inconsistency, the range of responses Zagzebski describes, and her reactions to those responses.
According to incompatibilists (i.e., those contending that foreknowledge
and freedom are incompatible), it follows from God's omniscience that he
knows all truths. But, since there were truths in the past about what his
creatures would do in the future, it follows that God knew such truths. What's
past, however, is accidentally necessary (i.e., out of our control), for our
power extends only into the future, not into the past. So God's past beliefs
about future actions are now accidentally necessary. But there's no possibility
of God's beliefs being mistaken. The fact that he believed that I will do
something, then, entails (and, indeed, is logically equivalent to) the fact that
I will do that thing. But accidental necessity is closed under entailment (or
logical equivalence). Therefore, since God's past belief that I would perform
a certain action is accidentally necessary, it follows that it is also accidentally
necessary that I perform that action. But an action which is accidentally
necessary - which is out of my control - is not one which is free, at least
not in the libertarian sense of freedom theists typically endorse. God's foreknowledge, then, is incompatible with human freedom.
Such an argument for theological fatalism is very similar to one for logical
fatalism, which argues from the mere fact that there were in the past truths
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about how we would act in the future to the conclusion that all such actions
are unfree. Though acknowledging the similarity, Zagzebski contends that the
argument for logical fatalism is actually much weaker. Our intuition that the
past is beyond our control, she maintains, is an intuition concerning the fixity
of past events or states of affairs, not an intuition concerning propositions.
Hence, it is much more plausible to think of God's past beliefs as being
accidentally necessary than it is to think of past truths about the future being
so (pp. 24-28).
Zagzebski's reasoning here, which depends in part on the assumption that
propositions cannot change truth value over time, is sure to strike many
readers as questionable. But I doubt that much hinges on our ranking such
arguments in degree of difficulty. Zagzebski is surely right in suggesting that,
if a plausible solution to the threat of theological fatalism can be found,
logical fatalism will not pose additional problems.
Zagzebski contends that, among the various solutions to the problem of
theological fatalism which have been proposed, there are three major types
which deserve serious consideration. Boethian solutions deny that God is in
time, and thus deny that he has beliefs at moments of time. If it is false to
say that God believed in the past that I would do such-and-such tomorrow,
then the fact that past events are accidentally necessary gives us no reason
to think that God's beliefs are accidentally necessary, and so the incompatibilist argument never gets off the ground. Ockhamist solutions concede that
God exists in time and had beliefs in the past about our future actions, but
deny that those beliefs are accidentally necessary, for Ockhamists see us as
having either causal or (more typically, according to Zagzebski) counterfactual power over God's past beliefs. Molinist solutions, on the other hand, view
(or at least can view) God as temporal and concede that his past beliefs are
accidentally necessary, but deny that accidental necessity is closed under
either entailment or logical equivalence.
Zagzebski's delineation of these three positions is not perfect. (For example, since Molinists would agree with the claim that we have counterfactual
power over God's past beliefs, all Molinists would count as Ockhamists as
defined by Zagzebski; Molinism would be but a brand of Ockhamism, not an
alternative to it.) Nevertheless, problems of this sort are rare. In general,
Zagzebski's presentation of the three types of solution is admirable for its
clarity and accuracy.
Equally clear are the reasons why Zagzebski deems none of these three
avenues a total success. Though critical of the attempts to show that the
Boethian picture of an eternal God is incoherent or implausible from a Christian standpoint, she maintains that the argument for theological fatalism can
be transposed into an eternalist key. Such an argument, which Zagzebski dubs
the Timeless Knowledge Dilemma, suggests that the realm of eternity is at
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least as fixed as the realm of the past; hence, God's eternal beliefs concerning
our actions render those actions just as unfree as his past beliefs would have
rendered them (pp. 60-63). As Zagzebski sees it, there are solutions to this
dilemma, but we need to go beyond the Boethian picture to find them. Ockhamist solutions receive an even harsher verdict from Zagzebski, who feels
that our initial intuition that all past beliefs are accidentally necessary retains
its potency despite the various ad hoc machinations of contemporary Ockhamists. "God's past beliefs," she says on p. 84, "seem just like spilled milk,"
and we have no more reason to countenance our having causal or counterfactual power over the former than over the latter. The Molinist solutions are
also dismissed by Zagzebski. She agrees with the Molinist that there are some
true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and thus labels herself a moderate
regarding middle knowledge. But she denies that there are enough such counterfactuals which are true logically prior to God's creative activity to provide
God with complete foreknowledge, and thus contends that the complete
Molinist picture which would justify our denying that accidental necessity is
closed under entailment is an untenable one (pp. 144-150).
My summary here does scant justice to the detailed presentation offered in
the text. Many of these details - e.g., her discussion of the artificiality of
many Ockhamist renderings of the distinction between hard and soft facts
(pp. 74-78) - are truly fascinating, and the level of argumentation is generally quite high. But there are occasional slips. This is especially evident in
her presentation (on pp. 110-115) of three arguments against power entailment principles, principles which (in essence) claim that "power to make
true" is closed under entailment or equivalence. Though I have also previously argued (in this journal and elsewhere) for the falsity of these principles, Zagzebski's arguments struck me as unimpressive. Take, for example,
her first argument. Central to this argument is the claim that there are certain
necessary propositions which God had the power either to bring about or to
not bring about. As an example of such a proposition, Zagzebski offers
(11) If there is a Fall, God sends his Son to redeem the world.

Commenting on (11), Zagzebski says:
God has the power to bring about (II) and the power to bring about the
negation of (11). But couldn't God decide to send a redeemer in any circumstance in which there was a fall? Doesn't God have the power to decide that
no matter what happened, if there was a fall, there would be a redemption?
If so, it would be the case that (11) is a necessary truth, true in all possible
worlds. And it would be a necessary truth precisely because God decided in
a certain way, a way in which he could have decided differently. (p. 111)

Such an argument is clearly fallacious. If God could have decided differently,
then there are possible worlds in which he does decide differently, and in
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those worlds (11) is false. So (11) is not a necessary truth. God's decision to
send a redeemer in any circumstances in which there is a fall guarantees only
the truth of (11), not its necessity.
Blatant blunders of this sort are rare in Zagzebski's criticisms. Still, there
is much with which her opponents might reasonably take issue. Especially
shaky (at least from my admittedly biased perspective) is Zagzebski's critique
of Molinism. Molinists contend that there are true counterfactuals of worldactualization (Le., conditionals of the form, "If God were to do X, world W
would be actual") which constitute part of God's middle knowledge. But
Zagzebski sees no way in which such a counterfactual could be known by
God logically prior to his knowledge that the world mentioned in the consequent is actual, given that such counterfactuals are supposed to be contingent.
"If God were to do X, W would be actual" will be true in W. but "If God
were to do X, W* would be actual" will be true in W*; hence, God cannot
know which counterfactual is true until he knows which world is actual, and
thus cannot use such counterfactuals (as he must if Molinism is to succeed)
to guide his world-actualizing decision. But such a criticism ignores the fact
that, according to the Molinist, a counterfactual of world-actualization simply
follows from oodles of ordinary counterfactuals of creaturely freedom; if the
latter can be known prevolitionally (as Zagzebski agrees they can be), there's
no problem with the former being known prevolitionally. Zagzebski might
respond that she had argued earlier in this chapter (pp. 134-140) that there
simply aren't enough true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to warrant
counterfactuals of world-actualization, for there are many cases where, no
matter how rich we make the antecedent, neither "If I were in situation S, I
would do A" nor "If I were in situation S, I would not do A" are contingent
truths. But Zagzebski's argument here relies on an uncritical assumption that
the standard analysis of might counterfactuals should be used to explicate the
assertion that, as a free agent, I might or might not do A were I in situation
S. Since philosophers have offered convincing reasons for calling that standard analysis into question, Zagzebski's argument against Molinism seems to
me to fall far short of the status of a refutation she accords it (p. 144).
Whatever one's assessment of her critical comments on the Boethian, Ockhamist and Molinist solutions, though, Zagzebski's own solutions to the foreknowledge dilemma are sure to arouse much interest. Zagzebski offers three
such solutions. One of these is based on a position she calls Thomistic Ockhamism. If we take seriously Aquinas' claim that the primary object of God's
knowledge is his own essence, along with the thesis that God's essence is the
same in all possible worlds, we are led to the conclusion that "God's mental
state of knowing is the same in all possible worlds" (p. 88); that one state
will have "the accidental property of secondarily knowing some contingent
truths in one world and another set of contingent truths in another world" (p.
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89). Such a position, she then argues, would sol ve the problem of theological
fatalism for two reasons: we could no longer view any particular contingent
action on our part as entailed by God's beliefs, and we could no longer
plausibly see God's beliefs as accidentally necessary.
While such a solution is surely intriguing, it seems clear to me that it
ultimately depends upon the Thomistic conception of divine simplicity. This
conception has undergone a bit of a revival of late, but the objections against
it are many and powerful. Hence, this first solution of Zagzebski's is likely
to be widely viewed as less than promising.
Zagzebski's other two solutions are presented via a discussion of the wellknown Frankfurt-Fischer case, where Black installs a mechanism in Jones'
brain which would cause Jones to choose to vote for Reagan should he show
any signs of voting for Carter, but the mechanism is never activated because
Jones chooses on his own to vote for Reagan. In such a case, many philosophers believe, Jones acts freely even though he couldn't have done otherwise.
But if ability to do otherwise isn't a necessary condition of freedom, then
perhaps actions foreknown by God can be free even though his foreknowing
them precludes our doing otherwise.
In developing this suggestion into her second solution, Zagzebski argues
that what the Frankfurt-Fischer case shows is that, if a choice is counterfactually dependent on the conditions that make it impossible for the agent to
do otherwise, the choice is unfree, but if that choice is counterfactually
independent of those conditions, then their presence need not be seen as
compromising the choice's freedom. Since, in the Frankfurt-Fischer case,
Jones would have voted for Reagan even if Black hadn't installed his nefarious mechanism, the presence of that mechanism doesn't count against Jones'
freedom. Suppose, then, that I do S and that God believed long ago that I
would do S. If it's true that I would have done S even if God hadn't believed
that I would do it, then his foreknowledge needn't count against my freedom.
But how defend the prima facie implausible claim that, if God hadn't
believed that I would do S, I would have done S anyway? Zagzebski attempts
to do so by considering conditionals about what would have been the case
had God not been omniscient and not believed that I would do S, and by
arguing that not all such conditionals need be seen as vacuously true simply
because their antecedents are impossible.
Though much of what Zagzebski says about counterfactuals with impossible antecedents seems on target to me, I must confess that the relevance of
her discussion of them escapes me. In defending the claim that Jones would
have voted for Reagan if Black's mechanism hadn't been installed, we're
assuming that the other factors which together with the mechanism necessitate Jones' vote (namely, the relevant conditions about Jones at the time of
installation, along with the relevant causal laws) remain constant. That is,
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we're saying that, had the mechanism not been installed and those conditions
and laws (still) held, Jones (still) would have voted for Reagan. We're not, I
take it, saying that Jones would have voted for Reagan had the mechanism
not been installed and had those conditions and/or laws been different. Had
things been that different from the way they actually were, who can say with
any degree of confidence what Jones would have done?
But then, in defending the claim that I would have done S if God hadn't
believed that I would do S, we'd similarly have to assume that the other factor
which together with God's belief necessitates my doing S (namely, the fact
that God is omniscient) also remains constant. That is, we'd have to be saying
that, had God not believed that I would do S and God (still) been omniscient,
I would (still) have done S. Since it's hard to see how any theist could affirm
such a conditional, Zagzebski's second solution seems to fail.
Zagzebski's third solution hinges on her claim that "an important
disanalogy between the foreknowledge case and the Frankfurt-Fischer cases
makes it most reasonable to maintain that in the former case I can do otherwise" (p. 162). For the Frankfurt-Fischer case depends upon their being
worlds in which Jones is prevented from doing what he otherwise would have
done by Black's intervention. But it can't be the case that my action is at
odds with God's foreknowledge. Had I acted otherwise, God would have
foreknown otherwise. God's foreknowledge is always in accord with what I
choose to do; it "prevents" or logically precludes only my doing what I don't
choose to do. Hence, Zagzebski concludes, it ought not be seen as incompatible with my ability to do otherwise.
Zagzebski's discussion of this third solution is much more extended and
detailed than this summary suggests. Still, I think enough has been said to
point to one central problem with this third solution. Zagzebski's argument
is reminiscent of soft determinists' claims that freedom is compatible with
determinism because an act which is determined need not be compelled;
determinism leaves us (very often, at least) doing what we want to do, and
(again, very often) is consistent with the claim that we would have done
otherwise had we wanted to do otherwise. Libertarians have traditionally
looked unkindly upon these claims, and insisted that more is required for a
person to be able to do otherwise. A similar reaction, I suspect, will not be
uncommon to those encountering this third solution. By itself, the fact that
God's foreknowledge can never thwart my will is insufficient to justify the
claim that I could have done otherwise.
For all their ingenuity, then, none of Zagzebski 's three solutions strikes me
as particularly plausible. Some readers will no doubt concur with this negative assessment, but, finding the three more traditional approaches Zagzebski
criticizes equally unpalatable, despair of finding a tenable solution. Though
such despair seems to me unwarranted, it does point to a truth which most
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of us, in rare moments of total honesty, have at least glimpsed. Any solution
to this problem comes at a price. Any solution commits one to saying things
that, other things being equal, one would rather not say. One may eventually
convince oneself that they're worth saying, and perhaps even that they are,
on reflection, not as implausible as one initially thought. But few of us ever
escape entirely from the penumbra of that initial implausibility. Zagzebski
does a fairly good job of pointing to the shadows of doubt which beset her
competitors' stances. My fear is that her solutions are accompanied by shadows at least as deep.

Mystic Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism, by Nelson Pike.
(Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1992. Pp. xiv & 224. N.p.

WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
An apter subtitle of this excellent volume would be "an essay in the phenomenology of Christian mysticism." Pike's book is divided into two parts.
Its first four chapters gather the data. The last four are "more critical" and
"provide a phenomenological account that fits the data assembled in the first
half of the book" (xiii). It concludes with three supplementary studies. The
first argues that (contrary to the standard interpretation) R.e. Zaehner didn't
think that monistic and theistic mystical experiences are phenomenologically
distinct. Monistic and theistic mystics interpret their states differently, and
react to them differently, but their experiences are the same. The second
criticizes Steven Katz's account of Christian mysticism, and the third attacks
Stace's contention that theistic mystics are irrational in not accepting the
monistic implications of their experiences of undifferentiated unity. I will
summarize Pike's argument and conclude with three critical comments.
The first two chapters describe the three principal forms of mystical prayer.
The soul is directly aware of God in each but the degree of intimacy and the
place of encounter differ. In the Prayer of Quiet, "God and the soul are close
to each other" (5). In Full Union and (the culmination of) Rapture, however,
they penetrate each other; God and the soul are held in mutual embrace. In
the Prayer of Quiet and Full Union, the encounter between self and God takes
place within the soul of the mystic. In Rapture, it transpires outside the
mystic's soul. Quiet and Union thus differ with respect to the nature of the
encounter but are alike with respect to its domain. In Full Union and Rapture,
the nature of the encounter is the same but its place differs.
Full Union and Rapture sometimes culminate in Union without Distinction.
In this state, the mystic no longer distinguishes between herself and God;
God is not experienced as a "not-me." Yet "the awareness of self can emerge

